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SPEAKING at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors
of the International Monetary Fund, Ralph Young referred to the
need to "construct a statistical bridge between the money surface of
things and the product surface...sothat monetary and other
public policies are determined with as much understanding as
possible." With this goal in mind, I have examined the two six-
quarter periods—December 31, 1951, to June 30, 1953; and June
30, 1956, to December 31, 1957—to see if I could detect significant
changes in the pattern of money flows through the capital market
during periods of severe monetary restraint.
Before I go on to indicate the procedures I have used, I should like
to congratulate the economists in the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System for the rich body of data they have made
available to us. Despite my own failure to find significant changes in
the pattern of money flows through the capital market during these
periods, I have faith that these data will eventually give us useful
information about the impact of monetary policies on the functioning
of the economy.
Procedure
My first problem was to divide the 1946—57 period into two parts:
the tight-money periods and the easy-money periods. Consider, in
this connection, the average yields on federal government securities
and average net free reserves reported in Chart 1.Clearly the six
quarters ending on June 30, 1953, were tight-money periods. Net
free reserves were less than zero beginning in the second quarter of
1952, and the bill rate was rising throughout the period. The last
tight-money period is somewhat harder to define. Net free reserves
were less than zero starting in the second quarter of 1955, and the bill
rate rose rather sharply during 1955. At the same time, bank loans
1RalphA. Young, The Federal Reserve Flow-of-Funds Accounts, at the Fund Informal
Session on "Recent Developments in Monetary Analysis," September 25, 1956, Press
Release No. 11.
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CHART1
Average Yields onFederal Government Securities
Reserves, 1946—57
and Net Free
















Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin.
continuedto rise sharply during 1955 and early 1956, from about
$86 billion on December 31, 1955, to about $105 billion on June 30,
1956.2Itwas only after June 30,1956, that there was a marked
slowing down in the growth of bank loans.Accordingly,I have
chosen as the second tight-money period the six quarters. beginning
on June 30, 1956, and ending on December 30,
hesitation about including the last quarter of 1957, in view of the
slight decline in the bill rate and the rise in net free reserves. But in
view of the relatively high level of the bill rate and the negative net
free reserves, I have included all four quarters of 1957 in the tight-
money periods. In this way, we can think of the 1946—57 period as
being largely an easy-money period, interrupted by two six-quarter
June 30, 1953, and on December
31, 1957.
Perhaps I should comment on definitions of tight-money implicit in
the selection of these periods. The Federal Reserve may be said to
have exercised some measure ofrestraint throughout the entire
period. Therefore, to designate certain periods as tight-money and
2"ConsolidatedCondition Statement for Banks and the Monetary System," Federal
ReserveBulletin, July, 1957. p. 784.
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others as easy-money periods is to ignore the different gradations of
tightness and their effects on money flows.
However, my objectives in this paper are very limited.I am not
interested in developing a.model which would permit us to predict the
way different gradations of monetary restraint affect money through
the capital market. Rather, I am interested in determining the extent
to which the pattern of money flows through the capital market is
affected by severe monetary restraints of the type characteristic of
the periods from mid-1952 to mid-1953 and mid-1956 to mid-1957.
I leave it to others to investigate changes in money flows characteristic
of various parts of the tight-money periods.
I had hoped to be able to use quarter-by-quarter figures relating
the tightness of money, as measured by the bill rate, to the money
flows during that quarter.But there appeared to be so much
seasonality in the quarterly data and, in view of the limited number
of quarters to be studied, so little opportunity to introduce seasonal
corrections that I decided to use annual totals. Because of limitations
of data, I used calendar-year totals through 1952 and fiscal-year
totals from June 30, 1953, to June 30, 1957. To give me more data
during the tight-money periods, I also used annual totals for the
years ending in March and June of 1953 and September and December
of 1957.
Using what might be said to be a naïve empirical approach, I
have summarized the money-flow figures for each sector, separating
the tight-money periods from the easy-money periods to see if the
tight-money periods appeared to be different from the other periods.
I then developed a hypothesis to explain the developments which
the figures seemed to suggest.
Empirical Results
CONSUMERS
The series of tables given below are, I believe, self-explanatory to
persons who have worked with these data. My objective was so to
combine the data as to reveal differences—particularly with respect
to financing media and patterns—between the tight- and easy-money
periods.
In Table 1I have summarized the financial transactions of con-
sumers taken as a group. The column headings, together with the
footnotes to this table, will explain the derivation of the figures.I
must report that, using these data, I could not find any significant
changes in the capital expenditures of consumers or in the amount of
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Dec 30, 1946 30.1 21.0 9.1 2.5 1.1 3.6 12.7
Dec 30, 1947 23.8 28.2 —4.4 3.3 3.3 6.6 2.2
Dec 30, 1948 32.1 33.7 —1.6 3.7 2.8 6.5 4.9
Dec 30, 1949 31.7 33.8 —2.1 3.4 3.3 6.7 4.6
Dec 30, 1950 38.9 40.7 —1.8 6.3 5.0 11.3 9.5
Dec 30, 1951 42.0 39.9 2.1 6.1 1.3 7.4 9.5
Dec 30, 1952 45.5 41.6 3.9 5.7 5.0 10.7 14.6
Mar 30, 1953 46.5 43.3 3.2 5.8 6.4 12.2 15.4
Jun30, 1953 48.1 44.7 3.4 6.4 6.2 12.6 16.0
Jun30, 1954 49.4 45.9 3.5 6.4 1.8 8.2 11.7
Jun30, 1955 46.6 50.8 —4.2 10.3 5.8 16.1 11.9
Jun30, 1956 49.6 53.6 —4.0 10.0 5.6 15.6 11.6
Jun30, 1957 52.0 52.0 0.0 8.3 3.5 11.8 11.8
Sep30, 1957 52.6 51.9 0.7 7.7 3.6 11.3 12.0
Dec 30, 1957 51.4 51.3 0.1 7.3 2.7 10.0 10.1
money available from credit sources to consumers during the tight-
money periods, with the exception of mortgage money. A priori,
we would expect funds available from mortgage credit to rise during
prosperous periods. Yet mortgage credit did not rise during the
first tight-money period. And during the second tight-money period
mortgage credit advanced to consumers declined.
Possibly as a result of the limitations on the amount of mortgage
credit, consumers, instead of absorbing funds from the capital
market, tended to supply funds to the capital market during tight-
money periods.But, again, the data are merely suggestive. Con-
sumers also advanced funds to the capital market in 1951 and 1954,
both of which we have classified as easy-money periods.
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SUMERS, SELECTED PERIODS, 1946—57
dollars)
Used for Cash and
Govt. Securities Used forIndirect Finance Used for Direct Finance
Currency Time Pro-Securities











(8) (9) (10) (Il) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
3.3 0.9 4.2 2.5 7.1 9.6 1.7 —0.5 1.2
—0.1 1.8 1.7 2.5 5.2 9.7 0.6 0.8 1.4
—1.1 —0.2 —1.3 2.6 2.3 4.9 3.2 2.0 5.2
—2.1 1.1 —1.0 2.6 2.6 5.2 1.4 0.7 2.1
0.9 —0.4 0.5 2.8 2.4 5.2 4.7 1.2 5.9
2.5 —1.4 1.1 2.7 4.4 7.1 3.2 2.0 5.2
2.8 —0.2 2.6 2.8 7.8 10.6 1.2 3.1 4.3
3.5 —0.4 3.1 2.8 8.1 10.8 1.2 3.1 4.3
2.6 2.8 5.4 2.8 8.4 11.2 1.2 3.3 4.5
0.1 —1.8 1.7 2.8 8.5 11.3 0.8 2.2 3.0
0.4 1.0 1.4 2.8 8.8 11.6 —0.2 1.9 1.7
—0.5 2.3 1.8 3.2 9.1 12.3 —2.6 6.2 3.6
—0.5 0.3 —0.2 3.4 11.0 14.4 —3.6 6.4 2.8
—1.0 1.7 0.7 3.3 11.3 14.6 —3.2 6.8 3.6
—1.9 0.8 —1.1 3.2 12.0 15.2 —2.8 6.2 3.4
SOURCE: Summary of the Flow-of-Funds Accounts, derived as indicated for each
column: (1) row A of Summary; (2) row C; (3) columns I minus 2; (4) rows Q and
R; (5) rows S, T, U, V. and Y; (6) columns 4 and 5; (7) columns 3 and 6; (8) row g;
(9) rows d and M; (1O)columns 8 and 9; (11) rowe; (12) rows b, c, and f; (13)columns
ii and 12; (14) row X; (15) rows N, 0, and P; and (16) columns 15 and 16.
The amounts consumers used to acquire cash and federal govern-
ment securities do not seem to be related to the tightness of money.
The total increased during the first tight-money period, and decreased
during the second period. Nor does there appear to be a relation
between the total amount used for the direct purchase of securities
and for direct investment in business during tight-
money periods.I thought I had detected an increased purchase
of securities during these periods, but the evidence is not con-
vincing.
The only change which seems to show up in the data is the increased
tendency on the. part of consumers, during periods of tight money,
to hold time deposits, savings deposits, and shares in savings and loan
243ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS OF DATA
TABLE
AND USES OF FUNDS, CORPORATE
(billions of


















Dec 30, 1946 5.8 18.1 —12.3 1.0 —6.9 —5.9
Dec 30, 1947 14.4 17.3 —2.9 2.1 —1.2 0.9
Dec 30, 1948 18.7 19.6 —0.9 0.1 0.7 0.8
Dec 30, 1949 15.7 13.9 1.8 1.0 2.0 3.0
Dec 30, 1950 24.4 23.6 0.8 1.6 2.9 4.5
Dec 30, 1951 24.0 29.5 —5.5 1.7 1.1 2.8
Dec 30, 1952 16.7 22.9 —6.2 0.7 —0.8 —0.1
Mar 30, 1953 17.6 22.7 —5.1 —0.8 0.5 —0.3
Jun 30,1953 19.8 24.1 —4.3 0.0 —0.2 —0.2
Jun 30, 1954 16.2 20.1 —3.9 —0.3 —2.0 —2.3
Jun 30, 1955 24.5 22.9 1.6 2.2 2.2 4.4
Jun 30, 1956 25.5 31.5 —6.0 —0.5 —1.1 —1.6
Jun 30, 1957 26.1 34.3 —8.2 0.3 —1.4 —1.1
Sep 30, 1957 26.3 33.7 —7.4 0.6 —0.9 —0.3
Dec 30, 1957 25.1 32.4 —7.3 —0.6 —1.1 —1.7
During both tight-money periods, the dollar amounts
devoted to these uses rose; but it is difficult to say whether this was
due to prosperity or to tight money.
Perhaps the most significant findings derived from the data are
that (1) during most of the years, consumers were users rather than
suppliers of capital market ,unds; and (2) in all periods, consumers
tended to channel their funds into the capital market through financial
intermediaries rather than through direct investments.But these
findings are not related to the tightness or ease of the money market.
They are, rather, related to the anatomy of the financial markets.
BUSINESS
In Table 2, 1 have summarized the financial transactions of corporate
business. During the two tight-money periods, corporate business
tended to require larger amounts of outside funds than during the
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dollars)






Credit Funds Total MortgagesSecurities Total Sources
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
2.4 —0.4 1.8 1.3 2.1 34 5.2
1.9 —2.7 —0.8 1.5 4.1 5.6 4.8
0.4 —3.0 —2.6 1.2 5.2 6.4 3.8
—2.0 —2.3 —4.3 1.4 4.1 5.5 1.2
2.1 —4.2 —2.1 1.8 2.9 4.7 2.6
4.6 —2.3 2.3 1.5 5.5 7.0 9.3
2.6 —4.0 —1.4 1.3 6.9 8.2 6.8
1.6 —3.0 —1.4 1.2 6.7 7.9 6.5
0.8 —1.0 —0.2 1.2 6.0 7.2 7.0
—0.8 —0.5 —1.3 1.3 5.3 6.6 5.3
0.7 —2.5 2.2 2.2 4.0 6.2 8.4
4.1 —1.7 2.4 2.1 5.2 7.3 8.1
1.9 —4.7 —2.8 1.4 8.4 9.8 7.0
1.4 —3.6 —2.2 1.4 8.7 10.1 7.9
1.0 —5.1 —4.1 1.4 9.0 10.4 6.3
SouRcE: Summary of the Flow-of-Funds Accounts, derived as indicated for each
column: (1) rows A minus C; (2) row C; (3) columns 1 minus 2; (4) row g; (5) rows
M and d; (6) columns 4 and 5; (7) row U; (8) rows S, T, V, W, and Y; (9) columns
7 and 8; (10) rows Q and R; (11) rows N, 0, and P; (12) columns 10 and 11; and
(13) columns 9 and 12.
other periods—and since the tight-money periods occurred during
prosperous periods, this is what we would expect. During the two
tight-money periods, corporate businesses appeared to finance their
needs by (1) selling federal government obligations and (2) issuing
their own long-term obligations—primarily bonds and other se-
curities.During both tight-money periods, corporations reduced
their holdings of cash and government securities, although they also
reduced them in 1946 and during the two years between the two tight-
money periods. During both periods, corporate businesses tended to
reduce their reliance on mortgage borrowing and to increase their
sales of long-term securities.But, again, it is difficult on the basis
of the evidence to say that this was due to tight money. Possibly
these developments were also associated with the fact that businesses
tended during these periods to increase their investments in fixed
assets.
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Dec30, 1946 2.9 5.5 —2.6 — 0.0 0.0
Dec30, 1947 3.6 6.9 —3.3 0.3 0.0 0.3
Dec30, 1948 4.3 6.9 —2.6 —0.7 — —0.7
Dec30, 1949 4.7 6.1 —1.4 0.2 — 0.2
Dec30, 1950 5.8 10.4 —4.6 0.4 0.0 0.4
Dec30, 1951 6.6 8.5 —1.9 1.1 1.1
Dec30, 1952 6.1 7.1 —1.0 —0.4 0.0 —0.4
Mar30, 1953 5.4 7.7 —2.3 —0.3 0.0 —0.3
Jun30, 1953 5.6 8.3 —2.7 —0.2 0.0 —0.2
Jun30. 1954 5.8 7.9 —2.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
Jun30, 1955 .8.5 10.1 —1.6 0.4 0.0 0.4
Jun30, 1956 9.8 11.0 —1.2 0.2 0.0 0.2















Perhaps more interesting than these tendencies are the changes
in the net short-term credit situation of corporations taken as a
group.During both periods, funds available from bank credit
tended to decline, falling from $4.0 billion in 1951 to $0.8 billion in
the year ending June 30, 1953, and from $4.1 billion for the year
ending on June 30, 1956, to $1.0 billion for the year ending on
December 30, 1957.During both these tight-money periods, cor-
porations advanced funds by short-term credit to other groups in the
economy, and thus served as a conduit to channel the funds obtained
from the sale of long-term securities to other groups. On balance,
corporations loaned more on short-term than they received during
both periods.During the first tight-money period, corporations
cut down on their net lending, presumably as a result of the reduction
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ollars)





Bank Term Net Total •
CreditCredit FundsTotal MortgagesInvestment Total Sources
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
2.1 —1.1 2.0 0.7 1.0 1.7 3.7
1.8 —0.5 1.3 0.9 1.5 2.4 3.7
0.2 —0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.2 . 1.9
— —0.2 —0.2 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.6
2.3 —0.6 1.7 0.9 3.5 4.4 6.1
—0.4 —1.2 —1.6 0.5 1.7 2.2 0.6
—0.8 1.3 0.5 0.5 — 0.5 1.0
0.0 1.6 1.6 0.5 0.1 0.6 2.1
1.2 1.0 0.6 1.6 —0.1 0.2 0.1
0.7 1.9 2.6 0.6 0.2 0.8 3.4
1.3 —0.1 1.2 1.2 —0.2 1.0 2.2
2.1 0.4 2.5 0.9 —1.8 —0.9 1.6
2.3 2.2 4.5 0.7 —2.8 —2.1 2.4
1.7 1.8 3.5 0.6 —2.6 —2.0 1.5
0.9 2.3 3.2 0.6 —2.4 —1.8 1.4
SouRcE: Summaryof theFlow-of-Funds Accounts, derived as indicated for each
Iumn: (1) row A minus C; (2) row C; (3) columns 1 minus 2; (4) row g; (5) rows
and d; (6) columns 4 and 5; (7) row U; (8) rows S. T, V. W, and Y; (9) columns
and 8; (10) rows Q and R; (11) rows N, 0, P, and X; (12) columns 10 and 11;
id (13) columns 9 and 12.
in bank loans;but during the second tight-money period, they
increased their net lending.
The picture which seems to emerge from an examination of these
data is that corporate businesses must rely heavily on the capital
market for the financing of their capital expenditure programs during
all periods; and during the tight-money periods, because of the
limited availability of bank and mortgage credit, corporate depen-
dence on the capital market seems to be enhanced. However, the
data merely suggest these conclusions; we need more data before
we can generalize.
In Table 3 1 have shown the same figures for noncorporate business.
I have not been able to detect any developments which are unique
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businesses are heavily dependent on short-term credit advanced to
them by banks and other businesses. From 1951 to 1957, with the
exception of one year, noncorporate businesses received net advances
from other businesses; and a substantial portion of their net require-
ments were supplied by these sources. But this is an obiter dictum.
I could see no relation between tight money and the net, short-term
advance from other businesses.
Table 4 presents the same data for farm business. As in the case of
noncorporate business I can see no relation between the financing
pattern and tight money. It is interesting to note the heavy reliance
of farm business on the net investment of proprietorships and on
mortgage lending.But, as far as I can see, the amounts available
from these sources are not related to the tightness or ease of the
money market.
Table 5 summarizes the data for all business (corporate, noncor-
porate, and farm) taken as a group. As we would expect, the data in
this table are dominated by the corporate figures already discussed in
Table 2. As I have indicated, businesses tend to sell federal govern-
ment securities and their own long-term securities during tight-
money periods to replace funds available by bank and mortgage
credit. However, I must hasten to add that the data merely suggest
this; we shall need a much longer series of tight-money periods
before we can say anything definitive about these tendencies.
Perhaps more important than the relations between tight-money
periods and financing patterns is the general picture of business
financing which we get from this table. The net amount of funds
from the sale of short-term assets and from short-term credit is very
small, usually less than two billion dollars. Indeed, I have the im-
pression that much of the short-term credit advanced to businesses by
banks and financial institutions filters through businesses to finance
the purchase of products being sold by businesses to other groups in
the economy. The bulk of the outside funds to finance the capital
expenditures must, of necessity, come from mortgages and the sale
of long-term securities. And during tight-money periods it would
appear that businesses must, if anything, increase their reliance on
the capital market. But, I repeat, the data only suggest this; they
are not conclusive.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Tables 6, 7, and 8 summarize the same data from the point of view
of the financial institutions. Consider the data in Table 6. Commer-
cial banks throughout the entire period received funds from (1)
stockholders (current surplus minus capital expenditures) and (2) time
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Dec30, 1946 12.5 25.3 —15.3 1.6 —6.9 —5.3
Dec30, 1947 19.6 25.8 —6.2 2.3 —1.2 1.1
Dec30, 1948 25.1 33.6 —8.5 —1.0 0.7 —0.3
Dec30, 1949 22.8 24.2 —1.4 0.8 2.0 2.8
Dec30, 1950 33.1 38.5 —5.4 1.9 2.9 4.8
Dec30, 1951 33.9 44.1 —10.2 3.0 1.1 4.!
Dec30, 1952 26.2 36.3 —10.1 0.3 —0.8 —0.5
Mar30, 1953 26.3 36.6 —10.3 —1.1 —0.5 —0.6
Jun30, 1953 28.6 37.7 —8.9 —0.3 —0.2 —0.4
Jun30, 1954 25.5 32.2 —6.7 0.1 —2.0 —2.1
Jun30, 1955 36.7 37.2 —0.5 2.6 2.2 4.8
Jun30, 1956 39.2 46.8 —7.6 —0.3 —1.1 —1.4

















and savings depositors. In addition, during nine of the twelve years,
the commercial banks liquidated securities in their portfolios. During
the period as a whole, the banks used the funds received from these
sources, together with the funds available from monetary expansion
(increase in average and demand deposits) to make loans to cus-
tomers. These customer loans took the form of either mortgage or
short-term credit. Did this pattern change during the two periods of
severe monetary restraint? Mortgage lending by commercial banks
declined,particularly during the1956—57 tight-money period.
Possibly because of the decline in mortgage lending, the amounts
advanced in short-term credit to customers did not decline as much
as one would have expected, averaging about $5 billion in the first
tight-money period and about $4.5 in the second tight-money
period. Omitting the depression years of 1949 and 1954, the average
250IMPACT OF RESTRAINT ON MONEY FLOWS
SOURCE: Summary of the
column: (1) row A minus C;
M and d; (6) columns 4 and
7 and 8; (10) rows Q and R;
(13) columns 9 and 12.
Flow-of-Funds Accounts, derived as indicated
(2) row C; (3) columns I minus 2; (4) row
5; (7) row U; (8) rows S, T, V, W, and Y; (9)





amount of short-term credit advanced to borrowers was about $4.5
biffion.
It is interesting in Tables 7 and 8 to see that savings institutions
and insurance companies do tend to act differently during tight-
savings institutions continue during
money periods to channel savings to customers largely via the
mortgage market.During the first tight-money period savings
institutions received a larger flow than they had been receiving from
depositors during the preceding years. Indeed, the flow was almost
doubled. But during the second tight-money period they received a
reduced flow from depositors. In both cases the savings institutions
channeled all they received into the mortgage market.
In contrast, insurance companies reduced their direct loans to
customers, largely mortgage loans, during both tight-money periods.
251
BUSINESS, SELECTED PERIODS, 1946—57
dollars)
Available from Short-TermCredit Availablefrom Long-TermLiabilities
Net Short- Other Long-
Bank Term Term Total
CreditCredit FundsTotal MortgagesSecurities Total Sources
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
4.8 —1.6 3:2 2.1 2.8 5.9 9.1
4.0 —3.0 1.0 2.6 4.8 7.9 8.4 •
0.9 —1.1 —0.2 2.0 8.4 10.4 10.2
—1.9 —1.7 —3.6 2.3 5.5 7.8 4.2
4.9 —5.5 —0.6 3.2 7.7 10.8 10.3
4.8 —3.2 1.6 2.6 8.8 11.4 13.0
1.6 —1.9 —0.3 2.4 8.3 10.7 10.4
1.6 —0.3 1.3 2.3 7.9 10.2 11.5
1.6 0.0 1.6 1.7 7.2 8.9 10.5
—0.3 1.2 0.9 3.3 6.1 8.4 9.3
2.4 —2.2 —0.8 4.1 3.8 7.9 7.1
6.4 —0.9 5.5 3.8 2.6 6.4 10.5
4.2 —2.7 1.5 2.8 5.0 7.8 8.2
3.1 —2.5 0.6 2.6 5.2 8.4 9.0

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































;IMPACT OF RESTRAINT ON MONEY FLOWS
During the first tight-money period, the total amount lent directly to
borrowers declined from $3.6 billion in 1951 to an average of about
$2.0 billion in 1952 and the first half of 1953. During the comparable
1956—57 tight-money period, the total declined from $4.2 billion to
an average of about $3 billion. During the same periods, insurance
companies tended to channel a somewhat larger percentage of their
funds into the capital market to purchase long-term
To summarize, commercial banks and insurance companies, taken
together, tend to limit their direct loans to customers during tight-
money periods. At the same time they tend, as a group, to acquire
long-term securities. Savings institutions, on the other hand, continue
to use all of their funds to service customers, largely in the mortgage
market. All financial institutions, taken together, tend to limit some-
what their direct loans to customers and to use more of their funds
for capital market purchases of securities.Again,. I should like to
make the point that the evidence is merely suggestive—not conclusive.
And so I must conclude that the naïve empirical approach to the
problem of detecting significant changes in the "money surface of
things" during tight-money periods was not very useful.I feel that,
we have learned something about. the anatomy of the capital market
but very little about changes in the money surface of things during
tight-money periods.
A Hypothesis To Be Tested
Possibly I would have gotten better results if I had started with a
more sophisticated hypothesis as to the effects of tight money.
Having looked at the data I am going to suggest a hypothesis which is
not inconsistent with the data but which the data are not adequate
to test.The hypothesis consists of three propositions and a con-
clusion:
1.It is presumed that there is a pattern of customer relations
which characterizes the capital and credit markets.Small
businesses tend to depend on banks and on suppliers of raw
materials for a flow of credit. Home builders tend to depend on
savings and loan institutions to finance construction loans, etc.
2. During tight-money periods the credit and capital market
institutions, realizing that the tightness is likely to be temporary,
attempt to maintain these customer relations by rationing credit.
They do this rather than increase the price of credit as far as
the tightness of the money market would permit because they
value their customer relations and want to keep at least some of
their customers during these tight-money periods.
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3. But this rationed flow of funds is inadequate during tight-
money periods to finance the planned rate of investment. As a
result businesses endeavoring to maintain a high rate of invest-
ment must seek a larger percentage of their funds from
nontraditional and noncustomer sources. These other sources
—such as the capital market—are (a) usually higher-cost sources,
even during easy-money periods, and (b) carry some sort of a
"finder's fee" in their costs. This finder's fee may be so labeled
(as when contractors seek construction loans from unusual
sources), or it may be merely the flotation costs of an investment
banker.
4. Thus, tight money limits investment spending by imposing
the special penalties and costs attached to selling securities in
the open market rather than through the matrix of customer
relationships characterizing financial institutions.
Conclusion
Are the data we have examined consistent with this hypothesis?
The answer is that the data are not inconsistent with this hypothesis,
but neither are they conclusive. Consumers faced with limitations
on the amount of mortgage credit tend to have a net balance to put
into the capital market, largely through financial intermediaries.
Corporate businesses, to get the funds to invest in new plants and
equipment, are forced to depend somewhat more heavily on the sale
of government securities during tight-money periods than during
other periods. Both banks and insurance companies tend to limit
their loans to customers and to increase their purchases of securities.
Thus, the data do suggest an increasing impersonalization of the
credit market during tight-money periods.
COMMENT
JOHN G. GURLEY, Brookings Institution
Dean Weiler and I for the past few months have both been poring
over the same data—he for this conference and I for the Joint
Economic Committee. I agree with him that it is a highly frustrating
business. But I definitely part company with him when it comes to
congratulating those economists who made my many sleepless nights
possible!
Dean Weiler reports that he has failed to find anything really
significant regarding changes in the pattern of money flows between
periods of tight and easy credit conditions.I wish he had not put it
like that, for the results that I got are similar to—or at least consistent
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with—his. I would like briefly to describe my results first, and then
compare them with his.
I organized the data on an annual basis for the period 1947—58. In
this period, there were three short business cycles, 1947-49, 1950—
54, and 1955—58.I have called each of the three beginning years a
"recovery year." Each of the three ending years is called a "recession
year," and the years in between are termed "prosperity years."
Four basic relationships seem to emerge from the flow-of-funds
data.The first three have to do with annual issues of primary
securities, the composition of these issues, and the purchasers of these
issues.The fourth concerns the relation of liquidity to rates of
interest.I shall speak about each in turn.
Primary security issues include federal, state, and local government
securities, corporate bonds and stocks, mortgages, consumer short-
and intermediate-term debt, trade debt, and "other" bank loans, the
latter being all bank loans not covered by the previous categories.
As a ratio to GNP (in current prices), annual issues of primary
securities were an increasing function of the change in the annual
rate of growth of national output, irrespective of the direction of
such change. During recovery years, when the growth rate changed
markedly, primary issues were unusually large relative to GNP.
During prosperity years, when there were comparatively small changes
in the growth rate, primary issues were relatively light.Finally,
during recession years, when there were again significant changes in
the growth rate, primary issues became quite heavy. Put differently,
aggregate expenditures for current output were financed more from
external sources and less from internal ones during recovery and
recession years than during prosperity years.
There seems to be a simple explanation for this. When national
output is growing steadily from year to year, the distribution of
income among economic units is likely to be quite stable relative to
the distribution of spending among them.Steady output growth
can generally be expected to preclude large shifts in expenditures and
incomes among economic units. On the other hand, large changes in
the growth rate of output, whether positive or negative, are likely to
"wrench apart" the two distribUtions, opening up large budget
imbalances an-tong economic units. This is because such changes in
the growth rate of output imply sizable increases or decreases in
expenditures of some economic units relative to their current income;
these in turn lead to sizable changes in income of other economic
units relative totheir expenditures.And these imbalances are
generally financed by heavy issues of primary securities and heavy
acquisitions of financial assets.
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The second relationship concerns the composition of primary
security issues. Many things show up here, but I shall comment on
only one finding. Divide total primary issues into two groups. The
first includes all government securities, corporate bonds .and stocks,
and mortgages. The second comprises trade debt, other bank loans,
and consumer debt.It is found that the first group made up about
one-half of total primary issues during recovery years, rose to higher
proportions during each of the prosperity years, and reached a peak
of 90 per cent during recession years. This behavior was remarkably
consistent from one short cycle to the next.
The third relationship has to do with the proportions of primary
security issues purchased by financial institutions, on the one hand,
and by all others—whom I shall call ultimate lenders—on the other.
For this purpose, I have defined financial institutions to include the
monetary system (made up of Federal Reserve and commercial
banks) and nonmonetary intermediaries, which comprise life insurance
companies, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,
credit unions, and the Postal Savings System. However, adding one
or two others, such as private noninsured pension funds, does not
change the results significantly.
These financial institutions purchased about 35 per cent of total
primary security issues during recovery years, 50 per cent during
prosperity years, and 70 per cent during recession years—and this
pattern was highly consistent from cycle to cycle except for one year.
Moreover, when primary issues were weighted heavily by. federal
government securities, the monetary system purchased relatively
more; and. nonmonetary intermediaries, relatively less. On the other
hand, when primary issues were weighted heavily by corporate
bonds and mortgages, the tables were turned: nonmonetary inter-
mediaries then purchased the lion's share while the monetary system
trailed behind. .Thetwo together, however, purchased 35, 50, or
70 per cent, depending on the phase of the short cycle.
The final relationship purports to explain the level of long-term
interest rates in terms of the ratjo of the public's liquid assets to
the level of GNP. Liquid assets .includethe money supply, time
deposits, all other deposits and shares in financial institutions, and
United States government, nonmarketable securities (mostly savings
bonds). The annual ratios of assets to GNP were plotted
against the corporate (Aaa) bond yield.forthe period 1945—58.'
The observations trace out a smooth curve .that at first falls fairly
sharply from left to right, and then moves almost horizontally to
1Inconstructing this demand schedule, money was weighted one, and nonmonetary
liquid assets, one-half. .
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form a very long tail. At the beginning of the postwar period, the
economy was far out on this tail. Significant increases in interest rates
were achieved only after the economy, after more than a decade, had
worked its way along this long path to the steeper portion of the
demand schedule for liquidity.
The final step is to bring these relationships together to describe
the financial aspects of short-cycle and long-term behavior of the
economy during the postwar period. In the early years of the period,
there was a substantial amount of excess liquidity in the economy
with respect to commodity markets.With respect to security
markets, the large volume of liquid assets had moved the economy,
as I said, far out on the tail of the demand schedule for liquidity.
General equilibrium would be achieved only at higher interest rates
and price levels; and in the absence of sharp reductions in liquidity,
the equilibrating mechanism was bound to work principally through
prices rather than interest rates.
Starting from this position, the economy proceeded through three
short business cycles, typically in this way. During recovery years,
external financing was relatively heavy, as reflected in high ratiOs of
primary security issues to GNP. Half of these issues took the form
of trade debt, consumer debt, and other bank loans, and were
financed by corporate business, sales and personal finance companies,
and commercial banks. Financial institutions purchased 35 per cent
of all primary security issues, which represented a fairly large part
of the relatively small issues of long-term securities. In these recovery
years, long-term interest rates rose slowly, because the liquidity
position of the economy, built up in the preceding recession year,
was only gradually reduced, and because long-term issues were
relatively light. On the other hand, short-term interest rates were
under greater pressure, partly because external financing tended to
be dominated by short issues.
During the next phase of the cycle, in prosperity years which
roughly correspond to Dean Weiler's tight-money periods, external
financing was reduced, and a larger proportion of expenditures for
current output was financed out of current incomes and by shifting
existing holdings of financial assets from one sector to another.
Thus, primary security issues fell as a percentage of GNP. These
issues, however, were composed much more of long-term securities
and much less of short-term. Financial institutions purchased half of
total primary securityissues, with nonmonetary intermediaries
participating most heavily when corporate bonds and mortgages
happened to be. a large portion of total issues.Despite this inter-
mediation, and the resulting creation of liquid assets, the economy's
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liquidity position continued to deteriorate, sending long-term rates
of interest higher.This upward pressure on long-term rates was
intensified by the relatively large volume of long-term issues. At the
same time, upward pressure on short-term rates was lessened.
Finally, during recession years, external financing once again
increased, as primary security issues grew relative to the level of
total expenditures. These issues were composed almost entirely of
government securities, corporate bonds and stocks, and mortgages.
The other issues all but disappeared. However, financial institutions
purchased almost three-quarters of total primary issues, creating a
roughly equivalent amount of liquid assets. This, together with the
decline in GNP, improved the liquidity position of the economy
significantly, and long-term interest rates declined. Short-term rates
declined even more.
At the close of each short cycle during the postwar period, the
economy's liquidity position was lower than at the start, the rise in
liquidity during recession years not making up for the fall in recovery
and prosperity years.Liquidity deterioration, however, was due
predominantly to the relative decline in the money supply, and hardly
at all to relative declines in nonmonetary liquid assets. The long
trek back along the almost horizontal tail of the demand schedule
for liquidity was accomplished slowly and jerkily by the monetary
authorities: slowly, because of the continued rapid rise of nonmonetary
liquid assets in the face of monetary restraint; jerkily, because each
recession poured large amounts of liquid assets back into the economy.
It was not until 1955, a decade after the start of the postwar period,
that liquidity positions were reduced sufficiently to have significant
impacts on long-term interest rates—though excess liquidity, with
respect to commodity markets, was largely eliminated by 1949.
I have presented my findings with much more bravado than Dean
Weiler presented his, and perhaps with no justification. Dean Weiler
compared two periods of tight money—January 1952 to June 1953,
and June 1956 to December 1957—with the remaining years of the
postwar period. Since these tight-money periods include three of my
five prosperity years, 1 can move with a fair amount of confidence
from one to the other. Dean Weiler seems to have three principal
conclusions—all tentative—one pertaining to consumers, one to
corporate business, and one to financial institutions.
Consumers, he found, tended to purchase more time deposits,
savings deposits, and savings and loan shares during periods of tight
money than at other times. Assuming that this statement implies
deviations from an upward trend, I have only a few small qualifica-
lions.First, the growth of these assets was lowest during recovery
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years, higher during prosperity years, but still higher during recession
years. Hence, it would seem best in this case to compare tight-money
periods with recovery and recession years separately, and not with
both combined. Second, the growth of these assets tended to be
higher, given tight-money periods, when corporate bonds and
mortgages were an especially large proportion of total issues. This
suggests that pressure on financial institutions from the demand side
of the loanable funds market induced them to seek funds more
actively.Third, it should be noted that the accelerated growth of
these assets in 1957—a year included in the tight-money period—
was largely due to the growth of time deposits, that this growth
coincided with a boost in the interest rate paid on these deposits,
and that during the same year the demand for United States savings
bonds declined by almost $2 billion.
With respect to corporate business, Dean Weiler found that this
sector tended to issue more long-term securities and less short-term
(i.e. bank loans) during periods of tight money, and that it tended to
sell federal government securities. Looking at the other side of the
market, Dean Weiler also found that all financial institutions, taken
together, tended to limit their purchases of mortgages and short-term
debt and to increase their purchases of long-term securities.
As I have noted, bank loans, trade debt, and consumer debt fall
steadily during the cycle as a proportion of total issues, from 50per
cent to less than 10 per cent. Taking their place are government
securities, corporate bonds and stocks, and mortgages. Thus Dean
Weiler's finding concerning corporate business and financial institu-
tions is not surprising. He did, however, fail to mention that financial
institutions may reduce their purchases of mortgages during tight-
money periods because other yields are rising relative to the fixed
interest rate on mortgages.
At the end of his paper, Dean Weiler presents a hypothesis about
the effects of tight money on investment spending. He supposes that
during such periods the economy finds it more difficult to obtain
loanable funds from financial institutions—from traditional sources.
The institutions begin to ration funds, some demands go unsatisfied,
and so primary securities are sold increasingly to the open markets
and to unusual sources, where the rate of interest, considering all
allied costs, is higher.In this way, tight money tends to reduce
investment spending.
On the whole, I think this is correct, though it does raise the
question of why the economy finds it more difficult to obtain funds
from financial institutions during tight-money periods, since economic
units are purchasing more claims on these institutions during such
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periods than during recovery years—since, that is to say, financial
institutions are purchasing a larger proportion of total primary
issues during such periods than during recovery years.But the
answer to this, I think, is fairly clear, and it can be illustrated with an
exaggerated case.Suppose that during recovery years all primary
issues take the form of consumer debt, trade debt, and bank loans.
These issues are purchased by sales and personal finance companies,
by business firms, and by commercial banks. Nonmonetary inter-
mediaries stand still. Now we move into the prosperity years of the
cycle. All primary issues now take the form of government securities,
corporate bonds and stocks, and mortgages. Borrowers form long
lines in front of our financial institutions, deserting the lenders who
aided them during the recovery year. The intermediaries press hard
for additional funds, raising interest rates on their deposits and shares,
stepping up advertising, offering free trips to Atlantic City, and so
on. This results in an increase in purchases by economic units of
claims on these intermediaries, enabling the latter to take a larger
proportion of primary issues than they did in the recovery years.
But, given the drastic change in the composition of primary issues
and the resulting increase in demands on them, this is not enough.
And the rest of Dean Weiler's story follows.
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